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President Barack Obama and his new administration inherited an
economic mess that was quickly transforming into a deep eco-
nomic malaise when he took office on January 20, 2009. With
remarkable speed, the Obama administration managed to sign into
law on February 19 a package of spending increases and tax cuts
known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).
According to the administration, ARRA will create or save approx-
imately 3.5 million jobs by the end of 2010. The transfers and tax
cuts included in the legislation are expected to provide relief to low-
income and vulnerable households especially hurt by the economic
crisis, while at the same time supporting aggregate demand.1
Our aim is to provide a preliminary assessment of ARRA in
terms of its likely impact on median household income, gaps
between advantaged and disadvantaged population subgroups,
and income inequality. A central motivation for evaluating the
Act from this particular standpoint was articulated quite
poignantly by President Obama himself in his historic inaugu-
ration speech: “The success of our economy has always depended
not just on the size of our gross domestic product, but on the
reach of our prosperity; on the ability to extend opportunity to
every willing heart—not out of charity, but because it is the
surest route to our common good.”2
Estimating Employment and Distributional Effects
Our strategy to assess the implications of the Recovery Act con-
sists of three main steps: constructing a baseline scenario against
which the effects of the Act can be assessed, estimating the
increase in employment by industry and occupation, and simu-
lating the accompanying effects of changes in earnings on the dis-
tribution of money income.(A fuller discussion of the model and
findings can be found in Zacharias, Masterson, and Kim 2009.)
The baseline scenario of labor market conditions and dis-
tribution of income was constructed from the 2008 Annual
Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Census Bureau’s
monthly Current Population Survey (CPS). To overcome the
drawback of using data that reflects the income situation and labor
market experience of individuals in 2007—when the recession was
only just beginning—we imputed, for all civilian adults, labor force
status in January 2009 and total income for the year 2008.
Admittedly, imputation has its hazards; yet it is better than assum-
ing as a baseline a sample that does not reflect the steep rise in job-
lessness during 2008 and the accompanying changes in income.
Estimating the increase in employment effect requires us to
identify the appropriate amount of fiscal stimulus (i.e., net addi-
tion to final demand) imparted by ARRA. Our starting point was
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimate of the budget-
ary cost of the Act over the period 2009–19—roughly $787 bil-
lion. We deducted approximately $256 billion from this estimate
to derive an appropriate amount of fiscal stimulus for the period
2009–11.3 The majority (54 percent) of the resulting $531 bil-
lion was accounted for by tax cuts, while government purchases
and transfers each accounted for 23 percent.
We used the 2006 input-output table for 201 industries to
estimate the employment effect of government purchases of
goods and services. The increase in government purchases was
distributed across the final demand for the industries’ products.
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Copyright © 2009We employed two alternative assumptions about the distribution
of the increase in final demand across industries. Under the first,
which reflects national accounting conventions, we distributed
the additional final demand among the government industries in
the table; we refer to this as the “government” assumption. The
second alternative assumption involves distributing the increase
in final demand across government and private industries, with
the latter capturing most of the increase and government indus-
tries receiving only those outlays destined for tasks that, under
the current institutional arrangements, are essentially performed
by government bodies. This assumption, called the “private”
assumption, reflects the older national accounting view that gov-
ernment is solely a consumer, rather than the current view that
regards government as a consumer and producer.
Following the conventional method, the impact of tax cuts
and transfers on GDP were calculated using a set of multipliers
that converts an additional dollar of government expenditure (or
tax cut) into an increase in GDP.4 For each tax cut and transfer,
the CBO has specified the range of values for the multiplier
(CBO 2009); we constructed scenarios using the high value and
the midpoint of the range as alternative values. The resulting
increase in aggregate GDP was distributed among the major indus-
tries according to their GDP shares in 2006. In the next step, using
the 2006 employment-to-GDP ratios, the increases in GDP by
industry were translated into increases in employment by industry.
The employment estimates generated by the input-output
and conventional methods were combined to arrive at the total
additional employment that accrued to each major industry as a
result of the stimulus. We assumed that the additional employ-
ment created by ARRA would be split across major occupations
in each industry in the same proportions that total employment
was split in 2006. 
In the final step, we assumed that the additional demand for
labor created by the stimulus would be met by an increased sup-
ply of labor from the pool of “employable” individuals in the
ASEC.5 We matched individuals with jobs and imputed the
annual earnings of the newly employed. Then we calculated the
total personal income (earnings plus all other money income)
of the newly employed and the income of the households in
which they lived, on the assumption that components of their
personal income other than earnings and the personal income
of individuals other than the newly employed would remain
unchanged.
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Notes: We estimated the potential additional employment from the stimulus 
under two sets of values for the multipliers for transfers, taxes, and subsidies 
(“high” and “medium”) and under two assumptions regarding the industrial 
distribution of final demand generated by government purchases 
(“government” and “private”). The combination of assumptions produces 
four scenarios.
Sources: Authors’ estimates, CBO (2009), CEA (2009), and Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 













Category 12/07 Job Losses ARRA1 to 12/07
A. Sex
Men 53.3 73.5 59.8 -0.02
Women 46.7 26.5 40.2 0.01
B. Race/Ethnicity
White 69.0 64.6 60.5 -0.01
Nonwhite 31.0 35.4 39.5 0.002
C. Education
Less than high school 10.6 28.3 3.6 -0.10
High school graduate 29.3 51.6 21.1 -0.05
Some college 28.8 15.3 36.5 0.03
College graduate 31.3 4.7 38.8 0.04
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.002
Table 1 Recession Job Losses versus Estimated ARRA Job
Creation, by Demographic Group (in percent)
1. Estimates of ARRA employment were obtained under the “government–
medium” scenario.
2.  Indicates a number between minus 0.01 percent and plus 0.01 percent.
Source: Authors’ calculationsThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 3
How Many New Jobs, and Who Gets Them?
Our estimates of new jobs under four discrete scenarios are
shown in Figure 1, along with the estimates by the CBO and the
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA). It is a remarkable coinci-
dence that the estimates of new jobs under our “medium” sce-
narios are nearly identical to the administration’s estimate.
However, even with the potential for an additional 6.2 million
jobs over 2009–11, it is sobering to note that, as of May 2009,
total employment has already fallen by 7 million since the start
of the recession in December 2007 according to the monthly
CPS. Given that a sizable decline in employment is likely to occur
during the period of projection, even our “high” scenario estimates
(8.6 to 8.8 million) or the estimate of the CBO (7.7 million)
will largely have a palliative rather than a curative effect on the
employment crisis.
While the ameliorating impact of the stimulus plan on the
employment situation is surely welcome, it appears that the gov-
ernment could have achieved more at the same cost by skewing
the stimulus package toward outlays rather than tax cuts. In
accordance with the general macroeconomic consensus, we
found that the amount of stimulus required per new job created
was much higher for taxes than outlays under all scenarios. Each
additional job would cost approximately $69,000 in tax cuts ver-
sus $52,000 in spending increases in the “medium” scenarios, and
$110,000 versus $69,000 in the “high” scenarios.
We assessed the equity aspects of job creation under ARRA
by asking whether it creates jobs for (1) those hit hardest by the
recession and (2) those groups that are, as a whole, considered
disadvantaged in the labor market (Table 1). The first criterion
would suggest that the job creation favors women over men,
nonwhites over whites,6 and those who attended or graduated
from college over the less educated. In contrast, the second cri-
terion indicates that job creation would not favor women and
nonwhites. By either standard, the picture for those who have
not attended college appears to be particularly bleak. This group
made up about 40 percent of total employment at the start of
the recession and accounted for 80 percent of job losses, yet its
share of ARRA employment is likely to be less than 25 percent.
The final column in the table shows the difference between
jobs created under ARRA and jobs lost in the recession (as of
March 2009) as a percentage of the level of employment in
December 2007. Women are likely to gain more jobs than the
number they have lost in the current recession as of March 2009;
consequently, their level of employment will be slightly higher
than at the start of the recession as a result of ARRA. Whites 
lose ground in employment relative to the start of the recession
even with ARRA, while nonwhites make no significant gain.
Individuals who have not graduated from high school will suffer
the largest loss, even after accounting for the employment gains
from ARRA, followed by those with just a high school degree. It
is worth emphasizing that these estimates are constructed by
ignoring job losses that have occurred since April 2009, and fur-
ther job losses are likely during the current recession. They also
assume that any additional employment from the stimulus is cre-
ated instantaneously.
Effects of the New Jobs on Income Growth and
Income Distribution
We next turn to our estimates of median household income
(Figure 2). The peak of the real household money income series
for 1967–2007 occurred in 1999 at approximately $52,800 (in
2008 dollars), which we have set equal to 100 in the figure. The
values for the other years are expressed as a percentage of the
1999 level. Our estimates for 2008 and 2008 with ARRA effects
are shown by the bars labeled, respectively, “2008” and “2008-
ARRA.” We find that median household income is likely to decline
Figure 2  The Effects of ARRA on Median Household Income 
(1999 = 100)  
Notes: The effects of ARRA were estimated under the “government–medium” 
scenario. The bar labeled “2008-ARRA” represents the baseline revised to 
include the effects of ARRA.   
Sources: The estimates for 2008 and 2008-ARRA are authors’ estimates. The 
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Notes: “2008-ARRA” represents the baseline revised to include the effects of 
ARRA estimated under the “government–medium” scenario. The percentage 
shares in aggregate income in 2007 were as follows: top quintile, 49.6 percent; 
fourth quintile, 23.7 percent; third quintile, 14.8 percent; second quintile, 8.6 
percent; and bottom quintile, 3.6 percent.  
Source: Authors’ estimates 
Figure 3 Change in the Share of Aggregate Income by 





















Bottom   Second   Third   Fourth   Top
Figure 4 The Effects of ARRA on Disparities in Money 
Income among Selected Subgroups of Households (ratio of 
mean values) 
Notes: The effects of ARRA were estimated under the “government–medium” 
scenario. The bars labeled “2008-ARRA” represent the baseline revised to 
include the effects of ARRA. The ratios shown are defined as follows: 
nonwhite relative to white; each educational group relative to college 
graduates; and single female–headed families relative to married couples.  
 Source: Authors’ calculations
in 2008 by 1.5 percent. The effect of ARRA on household income
is estimated to slightly more than offset that decline. If it were to
materialize, the level of income will still be lower than what the
average household received in 1999 and 2000, but it might rep-
resent a softening of the blow delivered on the middle class by the
current economic crisis.
The Obama administration has estimated that the likely
impact of ARRA will be to boost the average money income of
the middle quintile of working-age families7by 2.3 percent (Middle
Class Task Force 2009). This estimate was obtained by projecting
the impact of the expected decline in unemployment due to ARRA
on family income. Our own estimates for the same group of fami-
lies, however, show a much more modest gain of 1.8 percent.
We estimate that ARRA will improve the shares of all quin-
tiles in aggregate income, with the exception of the topmost
(Figure 3). However, the pro-poor pattern of income growth
under ARRA represents only a small compensation for the losses
suffered between 1999 and 2007 for the bottom 60 percent of the
distribution. The legislation’s likely effect on overall inequality
in money income might be negligible, since it does not address
systemic inequality in the economy.
The expected movements in household income generated
by ARRA typically appear to favor the groups usually considered
disadvantaged. However, the likely size of those movements will
make no appreciable dent in the substantial disparities in money
income that exist among groups (Figure 4). Nonwhite house-
holds continue to receive an annual income that is 28 percent less
than that of white households. Almost no change is visible in the
income disadvantage of households headed by individuals who
are not college graduates. Those with less than a high school edu-
cation receive an annual income that is only 31 percent of that of
college graduates; for high school graduates and those with some
college education, the comparable percentages are 48 and 60,
respectively. The gap between single female–headed families and
married couples also appears to be unchanged as a result of the
legislation’s effects on household income.
Conclusion
The preliminary and tentative character of this exercise cannot be
emphasized enough. Only a small fraction of the total appropria-
tions made under ARRA has actually been spent so far. The spe-
cific purposes for which, and the manner in which, different levels
and agencies of government will spend substantial chunks of theReferences
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monies are still to be determined. The “known unknowns” about
the Act itself impose a sizable degree of tentativeness to any evalu-
ation. In addition, the methods and data utilized in conducting our
assessment are bound to change in the future as we refine our
methods and better information becomes available. Admittedly,
there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the construction
of most future economic scenarios, and ours is no exception.
All that being said, our analysis points toward the necessity
for a comprehensive employment strategy that goes well beyond
ARRA. The need for public provisioning of various sorts—rang-
ing from early childhood education centers to public health facil-
ities to “greening” of public transportation—coupled with the
severe underutilization of labor naturally suggests an expanded
role for public employment as a desirable ingredient in any alter-
native strategy. Government policies and priorities have to be




(accessed April 24, 2009).
2. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
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3.  The amounts excluded were the outlays for the State Fiscal
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differences among macroeconomic theories. For the admin-
istration’s approach, see Romer and Bernstein (2009) and
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